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ABSTRACT. At a time when urbanization represents a major trend in human history and when the majority of the world’s 
population lives in an urban environment, the urban regime theory, developed by Clarence Stone in the 1980s, offers an 
insightful framework for discussing how urban stakeholders are compelled to work together to achieve their goals. While 
research on urban regimes has historically focused mainly on democratic contexts, this article argues that it is time to use 
urban regime theory in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries in order to better understand how urban politics develop. 
With growing urban activism and huge territorial contrasts, Russia offers a good case study for testing the notion of “urban 
regime.” This article focuses on three cities in Russia’s Far North—Murmansk, Norilsk, and Yakutsk—that face common 
sustainability challenges in Arctic or subarctic conditions; it delves into the mechanisms of their urban regimes and categorizes 
them by type: instrumental, organic, and symbolic. 
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RÉSUMÉ. À une époque où l’urbanisation représente une tendance majeure de l’histoire humaine et où la majorité de la 
population mondiale vit en milieu urbain, la théorie du régime urbain élaborée par Clarence Stone dans les années 1980 présente 
un cadre de discussion intéressant sur la façon dont les intervenants urbains sont incités à travailler ensemble pour atteindre 
leurs objectifs. Depuis longtemps, bien que la recherche sur les régimes urbains se concentre principalement sur les contextes 
démocratiques, le présent article soutient que le moment est venu d’utiliser la théorie du régime urbain dans les pays autoritaires 
ou semi-autoritaires afin de mieux comprendre comment se développe la politique urbaine. En raison de l’activisme urbain 
croissant et des énormes contrastes territoriaux, la Russie constitue une bonne étude de cas pour mettre à l’épreuve la notion de 
« régime urbain ». Cet article porte sur trois villes du grand nord de la Russie, Murmansk, Norilsk et Yakutsk, aux prises avec 
des défis communs en matière de durabilité dans des conditions arctiques ou subarctiques. Il explore les mécanismes de leurs 
régimes urbains et les place dans des catégories selon les types suivants : instrumental, organique et symbolique. 
Mots clés : Russie; gouvernance de l’Arctique; régimes urbains; gouvernementalité; Murmansk; Norilsk; Yakutsk
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of governance has been widely used by both 
scholars and policy makers in the study of the Arctic region. 
It is understood as the way that different Arctic states 
negotiate their relationship and interaction, prevent conflict, 
and develop new legal and institutional instruments to 
increase regional cooperation (Pelaudeix, 2015; Wilson 
Rowe, 2018). Yet governance also has a second meaning—
that of the “governmentality” of a public space, defined by 
Michel Foucault (2008) as diverse processes or practices by 
the state to increase individuals’ willingness to participate 
in their own governance. While governmentality has mostly 
been studied at the state level and during a certain historical 
period (see Albert and Vasilache, 2017; Tennberg, 2018), the 
notion has been broadened to include all forms of public 
space, ranging from individual cities, to institutions and 
corporations. Now that the majority of people live in urban 
environments, urban governmentality has become a critical 
component of urban studies, as well as of urban policy 
making: cities are the main laboratories of new forms of 
living together. The notion of the urban regime, developed 
by Clarence Stone (1987, 1989) in the 1980s and since 
applied in many different contexts, offers an insightful 
framework for discussing how urban actors with different 
goals find ways to regulate their potential conflicts and act 
together to improve the governmentality of their city.
While research on Arctic urbanization and the 
development of cities in this harsh polar climate is growing 
(Dybbroe, 2008; Dybbroe et al., 2010; Nyseth, 2017), the 
concept of urban regimes has not, to the best of this author’s 
knowledge, been applied to explore these Arctic cities’ 
management strategies and sustainability challenges. Those 
cities largely dependent on single resources (often energy 
and minerals, but also marine) need to plan for changing the 
nature of their economic focus as these resources become 
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depleted. Those reliant on administrative and educational 
resources, mostly regional capitals, are experiencing rapid 
growth, with all the urban infrastructure challenges that 
this growth entails. Broadly speaking, as small towns are 
shrinking, big cities are increasingly seen as the main, if 
not the only, urban model capable of offering a minimum 
standard of living: good public services and infrastructure, 
connectivity with the rest of the country, and sufficient 
cultural life and educational opportunities (Hansen et al., 
2013). In an Arctic context, “big” means between 50 000 
and 300 000 inhabitants.
The main Arctic cities are located in Russia: eight of 
the 12 Arctic cities with populations greater than 100 000 
people, several of which have populations around 300 000, 
are there. In Russia, urban regimes are shaped by the 
broader political context, with growing centralization and 
a lack of institutional and financial autonomy. Nevertheless, 
Russia’s cities, including those located in the Far North, 
have developed specific governmentality mechanisms to 
forge consensus between state structures and different 
urban constituencies, mechanisms that this paper explores. 
This research is based on fieldwork conducted in 2013, 
2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018, with the support of two National 
Science Foundation grants, in the main cities of Russia’s 
Far North (Murmansk and the surrounding Kola Peninsula 
mining cities, Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk, Naryan-Mar, 
Vorkuta, Salekhard, Norilsk, Dudinka, Yakutsk, and 
Mirnyi). The article first discusses how the notion of urban 
regimes applies to Russia’s governmentality, then presents 
the three selected cities, Murmansk, Norilsk, and Yakutsk, 
before delving into the mechanisms of their urban regimes 
and typing them, respectively, as instrumental, organic, and 
symbolic regimes.
URBAN REGIMES AND RUSSIA’S 
GOVERNMENTALITY
Mossberger and Stocker (2001:812) summarize the 
main theoretical assumption of the concept of regime 
as follows: “Regime theory sees power as fragmented 
and regimes as the collaborative arrangements through 
which local governments and private actors assemble 
the capacity to govern.” Two notions included in this 
definition are important to this study: first, that power is 
fragmented, and second, that it requires collaboration—a 
reminder of Foucault’s (2008) notion of biopower and the 
internalization of power relations by individuals. As stated 
by Stone (1989:7), “to be effective, governments must blend 
their capacities with those of various nongovernmental 
actors.” In the context of a city, power is a combination, 
in varying amounts, of several actors’ influence: the 
municipal authorities, which represent the state and its regal 
powers, such as tax preemption and law enforcement; the 
business sector, public or private, which generates jobs and 
revenue; and a broader set of civil society actors with more 
limited yet non-negligible outreach, organized by aims or 
grievances, which can accept or contest the symbolic power 
exerted by the municipal authorities. 
Because all these actors lack sufficient resources to 
pursue their agendas single-handedly, they must come 
up with a set of tacit rules, applied with regularity, that 
the other city actors also recognize as valid. The type 
of coalition—the regime—that then emerges in each 
city represents a relatively enduring understanding of 
power, one that does not change each time a new mayor is 
appointed. Each city has its own local political culture that 
is simultaneously quite stable and capable of adapting to 
new contexts. This local identity should not be understood 
as detached from broader, national-level, trends, but as a 
way to mediate them at the local level. As Stone (1987:4) 
explains, “local decision makers do not simply follow 
the imperatives that emanate from the national political 
economy; they must also interpret those imperatives, 
apply them to local conditions, and act on them within the 
constraints of the political arrangements they build and 
maintain.” 
Historically focused on U.S. cities, researchers have 
progressively detached the concept of urban regimes from 
its North American context to study Europe and then 
more distant regions. To develop frameworks capable 
of embracing substantial variation in coalitions, Stoker 
and Mossberger (1994) proposed a typology of urban 
regimes that included three broad categories and further 
subdivisions within each. The first is instrumental regimes, 
which are short-term and project-oriented systems that are 
aimed at accomplishing specific goals. The second, organic 
regimes, are present in cities with tight-knit social fabrics, 
homogenous populations, and high degrees of social 
consensus; these systems are oriented toward sustaining 
the status quo, with little aspiration to growth or change. 
The third, symbolic regimes, attempt to change a city’s 
ideology or image and advance a specific set of beliefs to be 
shared with the population, usually in urban revitalization, 
conserving architectural heritage, developing urban 
aesthetics, and moving the city toward new resources.
Thus far, the notion of urban regimes has mostly been 
applied to democratic contexts and has not been assessed 
in authoritarian settings. Russia is an appropriate test 
case for examining the concept outside a classic Western 
representative democracy. For decades, the Soviet regime 
was authoritarian (even totalitarian during Stalinism) and 
the country was highly centralized. City development was 
conducted in a relatively unified manner, even if some 
local conditions were also taken into account, especially 
in the national republics (French, 1995; D’Hooghe, 2005; 
Bodenschatz et al., 2015). Population management was 
controlled by state authorities: from the 1920s to the mid-
1950s, millions of gulag (Soviet forced labour camp 
system) prisoners played a driving role in developing 
Arctic resources (Applebaum, 2004). The system softened 
in the mid-1950s, yet for the two following decades, young 
people who graduated from higher education institutions 
were still sent to their first job by a centralized mechanism 
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(raspredelenie), and only after several years could they 
decide to move elsewhere.
Today, many world indexes consider Russia an 
authoritarian country. Its Freedom House ranking for 
instance, declined from 4.5 in 1999 to 6.5 in 2017 (the 
ranking is based on a scale of 1 – 7, where the lower the 
number, the more free the people) (Freedom House, 2020). 
Yet this normative, Western-centric framework does not 
help us capture on-the-ground realities that are more 
complex and nuanced. After a decade of state collapse 
and huge social traumas in the 1990s, Vladimir Putin 
rebuilt what has been called “the power vertical.” First, 
the government stopped decentralization trends that could 
have endangered the country’s territorial sovereignty. 
Second, it rebuilt the state and its functions of raising taxes 
and providing public services (mostly by manual control 
(ruchnoe upravlenie), meaning that the federal state and its 
main actors take decisions and then apply them with little 
cooperation with lower administrative levels). Finally, it 
reasserted Russia as a great power (or at least an aspiring 
one) on the international scene (Sakwa, 2014). These three 
trends deeply impacted all of Russia’s regions, as they lost 
many of the financial and political prerogatives they had 
acquired in the 1990s, but improved their public service 
delivery and everyday governance. However, beyond 
this trend of recentralization, diverse governmentalities 
function on the ground: Russia’s cities remain highly 
diversified and each has its own coalition of power. Several 
elements explain this diversity.
First, Russia is no longer behind the Iron Curtain; it is 
an open country whose citizens can travel freely abroad. 
They can also move freely inside the national territory, 
even if some cities with strategic resources or located 
near borders are “closed,” meaning that citizens need to 
obtain an invitation from someone living there to enter the 
city. However, as Stone (1989:229) noted in his research 
on urban regimes, political power sought by the regime 
is the “power to” rather than the “power over”—meaning 
the regime seeks the capacity to act. Indeed, the Russian 
regime no longer controls the mobility of its citizens and, 
in the case of northern cities, cannot stop the flow of people 
leaving the cities or the smaller flow of people entering 
them. Over the past 25 years, Russia’s Far North has lost 
about one-third of its population (Heleniak, 1999, 2009, 
2010). This is an important element limiting the power of 
federal authorities: if they do not work to offer good living 
conditions in northern cities, their populations will simply 
leave for the more European parts of the country.
Second, the Russian regime is a hybrid one, combining 
democratic and authoritarian elements with patronal 
mechanisms that make the state a business to be shared 
by different vested-interest coalitions (Hale, 2011, 
2014). The difficult-to-achieve balance between these 
three elements—democracy, authoritarianism, and 
patronalism—necessitates regular ad hoc adjustments to 
avoid mass repression and societal backlash (Petrov et al., 
2014). It means that federal, local, and regional authorities 
are engaged in a permanent process of renegotiating the 
social contract with citizens, distributing rents, developing 
megaprojects, improving the quality of public services 
but also privatizing them through neoliberal reforms, and 
inventing new symbolic repertoires to legitimate the status 
quo. This explains the apparent contradiction between non-
federal state actors’ room for maneuver declining quite 
dramatically in recent years and the dynamic renewal of 
urban politics in many of the country’s cities, with new 
forms of urban activism emerging to contest existing 
policies and give voice to civil society actors (See IU 
Global Gateway Network, 2018, for ongoing research on 
that question.)
Russia’s regions and the majority of cities lost their 
right to vote for governors and mayors in the 2000s. Today, 
only around a dozen cities still have an elected mayor, and 
gubernatorial elections have been re-introduced in few 
regions. Equally important, the financial flows generated 
by the country’s main energy and mineral extraction 
giants—the high mineral extraction tax (MET)—have 
been recentralized. In the 1990s, taxes collected from MET 
were divided, with 40% going to the federal government, 
30% to the regional government, and 30% to the local 
government of the resource-producing district (Kryukov et 
al., 2011:265). But a new law allowed Russian corporations 
to pay taxes in Moscow, where their headquarters were 
located, rather than in the regions, drawing money out of 
them. Once Putin came to power, tax and budget legislation 
gradually evolved to favor the federal government. In 2002, 
the federal government’s share of MET taxes went up to 
80% and since 2010, 100% of them have gone to Moscow 
in exchange for which the federal state provides subsidies 
to regions (Orttung, 2017). Local authorities’ lack of 
accountability to the population—since the majority are 
no longer elected—and their lack of autonomous funds 
dramatically impacts the potential of local self-government 
at the city level. 
Yet even in such a challenging context there are different 
urban regimes. Looking at them allows us to explore the 
governmentality mechanisms of the Russian regime by 
moving away from the simplistic description of a top-down 
pyramid with Vladimir Putin at its apex, to show on the 
contrary, how each city can adapt and renegotiate the social 
contract to suit its own purposes.
THREE CASE STUDIES: MURMANSK,
NORILSK, AND YAKUTSK
For case studies, I use Russia’s three main northern 
cities: Murmansk, on the Kola Peninsula; Norilsk, on the 
Taimyr Peninsula; and Yakutsk, capital city of the Sakha 
(Yakutiya) Republic. They are among the largest Arctic and 
subarctic cities in terms of population: 295 374, 180 239, 
and 328 493, respectively (Rosstat, 2018). Murmansk and 
Norilsk are located above the Arctic Circle (68˚ N and 
69˚ N, respectively); Yakutsk is just below the Arctic Circle 
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(62˚ N), but its remoteness from any ocean except the 
Arctic Ocean gives it a very harsh climate similar to the 
Arctic. The three cities accumulate superlatives: Murmansk 
is the world’s largest city above the Circle; Norilsk, the 
largest built entirely on permafrost and Russia’s most 
polluted city; and Yakutsk, the largest subarctic city in 
terms of Indigenous population and the capital of the largest 
territorial unit of the Russian Federation, with 40% of its 
territory above the Arctic Circle (Fig. 1).
In terms of history, the three cities offer a striking 
diversity. Yakutsk, founded in 1632 during the Russian 
expansion into Siberia, had a centuries-long history, but 
faced mass development during the Soviet twentieth 
century. Murmansk (at that time Romanov-na-Murmane) 
was dedicated in 1916, making it the last town founded by 
the Tsarist regime (Fedorov, 2009). Norilsk was founded in 
1935 as a soon-to-be-infamous gulag, whose prisoners were 
sent to labour at the mines. During Soviet times, Yakutsk 
remained a modest and sleepy provincial capital, while 
Norilsk became the USSR’s main producer of copper and 
nickel, and Murmansk became one of the main fishing ports 
and host of the Northern Fleet. Both Norilsk and Murmansk 
experienced a golden age in the 1970s that caused their 
populations to peak in 1985 (195 000, Norilsk) and 1991 
(473 000, Murmansk), while Yakutsk is enjoying its own 
golden age now, in the 2000s to 2010s, with a population 
growing rapidly as of 2019. 
The three cities also have sharply divergent economic 
outlooks (Pilyasov, 2017). Murmansk benefits from a 
relatively friendly environment: just 50 km from the 
Barents Sea, the city hosts the only Arctic warm-water 
port thanks to the Gulf Stream. Even if life is regulated by 
polar nights and days, Murmansk’s mild winters and its 
relative proximity to central Russia make it a unique place 
on Russia’s Arctic coasts and less remote than Norilsk or 
Yakutsk. While the rest of the Kola Peninsula is dominated 
FIG. 1. Murmansk, Norilsk, and Yakutsk. Source: Emily Zhang for @PIRE.
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by mining cities, Murmansk benefits from a quite diverse 
economy, including a fishing industry and a commercial 
port dominated by the Murmansk Shipping Company, a 
leader in oil transportation and transshipment in the Arctic 
thanks to its partial ownership by Lukoil. In addition, there 
are some agribusiness-related industries and transport and 
logistics companies that take advantage of the port and 
railway. The city’s status as a regional administrative center 
for the Murmansk region secures state administration jobs 
and a developed retail sector (author’s interview with local 
researchers working on the city’s economic development, 
Murmansk, July 2015). As host to the Northern Fleet, 
Murmansk also benefits from a large contingent of military 
personnel. The neighboring city of Severomorsk, less than 
20 km away, with more than 50 000 inhabitants, functions 
as Murmansk’s military suburb (Revich et al., 2014:202). 
However, there has been little progress in technological 
innovation and the city’s student population, which 
declined by several thousand students per year in the late 
2000s (going from almost 40 000 in 2006 to 32 000 in 
2010), continues to diminish as students are lured away by 
the universities of central Russia. The failure to develop the 
gigantic Shtokman gas deposit cut short promises of major 
energy developments in the Barents Sea, which would have 
created a new economic sector for the city. 
Norilsk can be considered the biggest Arctic monocity, a 
designation that indicates that 25% of the population works 
in the city’s primary industry, more than 50% of total town 
production is generated by this industry, and more than 
20% of the municipal budget is dependent on it (Didyk et 
al., 2014:11 – 12). Its main firm, Norilsk Nickel, is Russia’s 
largest mining company and the world’s largest and lowest-
cost producer of nickel. It accounts for 20% of global nickel 
production and, in Russia, 90% of nickel, 55% of copper, 
and 95% of cobalt. Since the 1990s, the city’s population has 
been shrinking, first in a very disorganized way and now in 
a more managed way (Laruelle and Hohmann, 2017). The 
drop in global mineral prices, combined with environmental 
pressures—Norilsk is one of the most polluted cities in the 
world and the most polluted in Russia—pushed the firm to 
close its main nickel factory and contributed to a radical 
overhaul of the company’s nickel operations that refocused 
refining on the metallurgical complex of the Kola Peninsula 
and the Harjavalta site in Finland (Staalesen, 2016). If the 
Norilsk transformation and extraction factories close down, 
the future of the city, or at least its current size, will be 
called into question.
Yakutsk presents a much more diversified profile, with 
a mostly services-based economy related to the republic’s 
public administration, which is based in the city, and limited 
industry and agriculture. It benefits indirectly from the fact 
that the republic produces, through the state firm Alrosa, 
30% of the world’s diamonds and almost 100% of Russia’s 
diamonds. But since the mines are located in cities far 
from Yakutsk, the capital has been able to avoid becoming 
an industrial monocity. In addition to diamond mining, the 
republic has significant resources, including gold, gas, oil, 
precious metals, coal, and timber. It also has a lively private 
sector of small- and medium-size enterprises specializing 
in everyday services and retail and hopes to develop its 
transportation infrastructure to become a hub turned toward a 
dynamic Asia-Pacific region. The municipal authorities have 
chosen to promote small and medium private enterprises, 
as well as some science and innovation infrastructure and 
higher education institutions, a move that has set the republic 
apart in Siberia. It has a better investment climate than many 
neighboring regions, attractive universities, an extensive 
network of cultural institutions, and a booming construction 
sector (Deloitte, 2014).
A byproduct of these diversified economic outlooks, the 
three cities’ migration trends likewise diverge, showing the 
diversity of patterns of mobility in the post-Soviet period 
(Table 1). Norilsk and Murmansk have both seen their 
populations decline by about one-third, deeply impacting 
the social fabric and residents’ everyday life. The population 
balance has since stabilized: Murmansk lost only 12 000 
people and Norilsk gained 3000 in the 2010s. Yakutsk finds 
itself in a completely different situation: it is one of the 
fastest-growing cities in the whole Arctic. Between 1989 
and 2018, the population grew by 67%, a rise explicable by 
a phenomenon known as “replacement migration.” As in 
Murmansk and Norilsk, many people who were settled in 
Yakutsk during Soviet times left for European Russia, but 
in Yakutsk they were replaced by a massive influx of rural 
residents from the Sakha Republic (Sukneva and Laruelle, 
2019). This influx has impacted the ethnic fabric of the city: 
Yakutsk can now present itself as a genuinely Indigenous 
city, with Yakuts representing half of the inhabitants, 
while Norilsk and Murmansk remain dominated by ethnic 
Russians and other Slavic populations, such as Ukrainians. 
In all three cases, a new category of actors has also emerged: 
foreign labor migrants coming from the southern former 
Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Uzbekistan. For these labor migrants from deeply 
impoverished countries, finding a job in one of Russia’s 
Arctic cities is considered a professional and personal 
accomplishment (Laruelle and Hohmann, 2019).
THE ACTORS OF RUSSIA’S ARCTIC
URBAN REGIMES
Each city offers a different combination of interactions 
between the main urban stakeholders, contributing to 
the creation of specific urban regimes. The main actors 
include the federal authorities, the municipal authorities, 
and big firms (whether state or private), as well as several 
smaller civil society actors, who are less powerful but are 
nevertheless influential in negotiating the city’s regime. 
Federal Authorities
The three cities have different relationships to the 
federal authorities. Yakutsk is the capital of one of the most 
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important republics of the Federation—after Tatarstan, 
Chechnya, and Dagestan—and therefore enjoys more 
autonomy, both legally recognized in the Constitution 
and applied on the ground (Gorenburg, 2001; Giuliano, 
2006). While the republics’ room for maneuverability has 
declined with recentralization (Gorenburg, 2010), it has been 
retained in some sectors; for example, republics have the 
right to do their own branding abroad—a right that Sakha 
is maximizing. Because Siberian Indigenous populations 
are perceived as less threatening to Russia’s overall identity 
than the Muslim and north Caucasian populations, Moscow 
is comparatively unconcerned by Sakha’s modest autonomy. 
Murmansk is the regional capital of the Murmansk 
region, part of the Northwestern Federal District. It is closer 
to Moscow not only geographically, but also politically, as it 
is considered an integral part of European Russia. As host 
to the Northern Fleet, it is central to Russia’s defense and 
occupies a strategic location at the forefront of the tension 
line with NATO countries (Flake, 2017; Zagorski, 2018).
Compared to the other two cities, Norilsk finds itself 
in a particularly subordinate position in relation to federal 
authorities. Being at the heart of one of Russia’s most 
strategically important industries, mineral extraction and 
production, Norilsk does not benefit from any autonomy. 
It answers to the regional capital, Krasnoyarsk, but also 
on some questions, directly to Moscow. This political 
proximity to the Kremlin offers advantages in terms of 
getting things done and securing state subsidies, but it 
also deprives the city of the right to have a say in its own 
internal affairs (Humphreys, 2011).
Municipal Authorities
The Regional Democracy Index developed by Nikolai 
Petrov first at Carnegie Moscow and then at the National 
Research University Higher School of Economics is the 
only existing tool for measuring the democracy of regional 
politics in Russia. It takes into consideration levels of 
voting in local (regional and municipal) elections, the 
diversity of candidates, votes “against all,” leadership 
alternations, protests, irregularities and fraud during 
elections, corruption cases, freedom of media, and social 
activism, for example (see Petrov and Titkov, 2013). The 
index is measured at the level of the region, not of the 
city, and therefore does not capture the municipal echelon. 
Since Murmansk and Yakutsk are the main cities of their 
respective region or republic, the regional picture may 
nevertheless be considered fairly representative, whereas 
this is less clear in Norilsk given that the main city of the 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, Krasnoyarsk, has a livelier political 
landscape. That said, the index still gives us some insights 
into broader regional trends in the 1990s and 2000s (data 
collection stopped in 2010, so we cannot rely on it to 
identify the tendencies of the last decade), showing Sakha 
at the lowest level for our three regions, Krasnoyarsk Krai 
at the highest, and Murmansk in the middle (Table 2). 
At the municipal level, the diversity between the three 
cities is likewise striking. Yakutsk is the only one of the 
three cities whose mayor is still elected by the population. 
In September 2018, its residents elected Sardana 
Avksentieva, a Sakha female politician well integrated into 
the city’s fabric where she has spent her entire career in the 
local administration and in big city firms such as the airport 
(SakhaLife, 2018). A representative of the leftist (social-
democrat) Party of Rebirth of Russia, led by Gennadii 
Seleznev at the national level, Avksentieva defeated the 
candidate from the presidential party, United Russia—a 
sign of the openness of the Yakutsk political landscape. 
The city’s political life is characterized by competition and 
pluralism, with a complicated balance between different 
clans, both territorial and corporate. The republic as a 
whole was among the most democratic at the end of the 
1990s, then declined to fall below the national average 
before rebounding. The 2014 election for the regional head, 
for instance, was among the most competitive in Russia 
(Petrov, 2017).
In Murmansk, as in Norilsk, the mayoralty has been 
replaced by a head of the city council, a position elected 
by the city’s Council of Deputies and perceived as more 
managerial than political. In Murmansk, the new head of 
the city, Tatiana Priamikova, represents United Russia. 
A teacher by training, she entered local political life in 
the 1990s and has occupied several high-level positions 
in the municipality over the past decade (Murmanskii 
vestnik, 2018). The election and nomination of high-level 
civil servants like Priamikova is typical, confirming the 
deputies’ control of administrative resources.
The new head of Norilsk’s city council, nominated 
in 2017, is Rinat Akhmechin, a Tatar who has worked in 
several Norilsk Nickel subsidiaries (City of Norilsk, 2018b). 
The fact that the head of the city council comes from the 
industrial realm typifies the “company town” identity 
of Norilsk. Yet contrary to what one might expect, the 
city has its own political culture, with developed protest 
TABLE 1. Main economic and demographic indicators for Murmansk, Norilsk, and Yakutsk in 2017.
  Municipal budget Amount transferred  Demographic trends
Economic profile in billion rubles from other budgets Inhabitants (migration and birth rates)
Murmansk Concentration in some sectors 12 4.9 (41%) 298 096 Declining
  (commercial port, military, transport hub)
Norilsk Industrial monocity 17 9.4 (55%) 178 106 Declining
Yakutsk Diverse 14.7 7.5 (51%) 324 651 Growing
Source: Federal State Statistics Service, 2017a–c.
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sentiments—probably a legacy of Soviet-era industrial 
workers. The city is infamous for its extremely low 
turnout on election days, yet in 2003 the residents elected 
rebellious trade union leader Valerii Melnikov despite 
the local administration’s efforts to disqualify him. Since 
2007, the city has been governed by a hired city manager. 
Nonetheless, on the regional democracy index, the city 
is rated “more democratic than Taimyr and almost as 
democratic as Krasnoyarsk Krai as a whole, despite being a 
closed company town” (Petrov, 2017:23).
The three cities’ municipal authorities also rely on quite 
distinct budgets. Despite being the smallest city of the 
three, with half the inhabitants of the others, Norilsk has 
the highest budget (17 billion rubles), followed by Yakutsk 
and then Murmansk. This difference is accentuated by the 
share transferred from other budgets: central state subsidies 
comprise 55% of Norilsk’s budget, 51% of Yakutsk’s, and 
41% of Murmansk’s. These numbers reflect Moscow’s 
protective policy toward Norilsk compared to other cities. 
A look at municipal expenditures for 2017 illustrates the 
diverse status of the three cities: Norilsk spends four to 
five times more on law enforcement agencies and national 
security than the other cities; it spends five times more than 
Yakutsk and 12 times more than Murmansk on transport 
and infrastructure management and repair. However, it 
lags somewhat behind the two others in promoting culture 
(except sport activities, where it predominates). Murmansk 
is the only city of the three to have a budget (albeit small) 
for environmental defense, but it spends less than the other 
two cities on education and on housing. Yakutsk spends 
more than the others on social policies and housing, a 
sign of its booming demography (Federal State Statistics 
Service, 2017a, b, c).
Big Firms
The third stakeholder in urban regimes is the economic 
sector, embodied by big private or public firms. In 
the Russian context, the main energy firms have been 
renationalized, while the majority of mineral extraction 
industries remain in private hands. Nonetheless, the 
proximity of the main mining oligarchs to the Kremlin 
is such that big extraction firms can, in many respects, 
be considered public firms, in the sense that they remain 
under state influence in deciding many of their policies 
and continue to provide public services in the regions 
where they operate. As in Soviet times, but now under the 
more neoliberal labels of “corporate social responsibility” 
or “social license” (Wilson, 2017), big firms are pushed 
to invest locally in new infrastructure (transport, sport 
complexes, health care, and education) that the municipal 
budget cannot cover, to subsidize energy and employ local 
workers (Gaddy and Ickes, 2010, 2013).
As a company town, Norilsk embodies this symbiotic 
relationship between the municipal authorities and the 
firm Norilsk Nickel. The firm provides for 90% of the 
municipal budget (City of Norilsk, 2018a). The corporate 
identity of the city is evidenced by Norilsk Nickel’s main 
administration being hosted in the most prestigious and 
imposing building in the city’s downtown; the streets are 
also lined with billboards celebrating Norilsk Nickel’s 
production. The firm funds the expensive repairs required 
by the city’s airport—lacking road or rail links, the city is 
only accessible by air or in summer, by transportation along 
the Yenisei River. It also supports many of the cultural and 
charitable activities offered in town in the name of its social 
corporate responsibility (Norilsk Nickel, 2018b), works 
closely with the Orthodox Church, and in the early 1990s, 
funded a small commemorative monument on the site of 
the erstwhile gulag (author’s fieldwork and interviews with 
local associations and the city council, Norilsk, July 2013 
and July 2015).
Norilsk Nickel also controls the demographics of the 
city by gradually shrinking its workforce: the number of its 
employees has plummeted from 140 000 during the Soviet 
period to 122 000 in 1996, 84 000 in 2001, and 78 000 in 
2017 (Norilsk Nickel, 2018a). To attract qualified engineers 
and their families, the firm has built new fully-furnished 
apartment complexes, but it also tries to optimize population 
management by offering retirees incentives to leave, thus 
allowing the company to avoid expenses associated with 
aging (Parente, 2012; author’s fieldwork and interviews with 
Norilsk Nickel representatives, Norilsk, July 2013 and July 
2015). In the first decade of the 2000s, the firm cut several 
entitlement programs inherited from the Soviet system 
(pensions, health care, public transportation, and other 
services), shifting costs to the municipality. As early as the 
end of the 1990s, it was undertaking (unsuccessfully) large-
scale resettlement programs to reduce the city’s population 
(Glazunov, 2010); further, between 2011 and 2015, it 
invested 128 million rubles in resettlement programs with 
the goal of sending “populations from Norilsk and Dudinka 
to regions of the Federation that have more suitable living 
and climatic conditions” (Godovoy otchet Noril’sk Nikel’a, 
2015). Norilsk Nickel is thus the central actor of urban 
politics in Norilsk.
TABLE 2. Level of democracy by region according to the Regional Democracy Index (higher number = more democratic).
 2001–10 Level of democracy by data 2006–10 Level of democracy by expert rating
Murmansk region 30–35 35
Krasnoyarsk Krai 26–30 40
Sakha (Yakutiya) 21–28 27
Source: Petrov and Titkov, 2013.
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In Yakutsk, the situation is quite different because the 
state diamond extraction firm, Alrosa, operates mostly 
outside the city, in other regions of the republic. It has two 
headquarters, in Moscow and Mirnyi (Russia’s “diamond 
capital,” 800 km from Yakutsk), and only a representative 
office in Yakutsk. Most of its social programming is thus 
focused on Mirnyi, not Yakutsk (Alrosa, 2015). The city 
therefore lacks a Norilsk-style symbiotic relationship with 
Alrosa. 
The case of Murmansk stands out, as the city is not home 
to any large extraction or energy firm. The commercial 
port still plays a key role, especially the private Murmansk 
Shipping Company, which, with 300 vessels and its 
headquarters in Murmansk, is the city’s largest enterprise. 
It funds about 100 million rubles in social and charitable 
programs for the city, as well as subsidizes housing for 
its employees with young families (Murmanskii Morskoi 
Torgovyi Port, 2018). In terms of influence, the shipping 
company is followed by the state-controlled Atomflot (part 
of the Rosatom corporation), the service company in charge 
of maintaining Russia’s nuclear-powered icebreakers. Some 
major transport logistics companies such as PEK, which 
moves furniture all over Russia, post-Soviet countries, and 
China, are second-tier yet important actors that employ 
local workers. 
Civil Society Actors
The fourth actor category encompasses all the 
components of “civil society,” a term that includes labor 
unions, charitable associations, community groups, and 
individual entrepreneurs. Obviously, the term should be 
used with caution given that the broader Russian political 
context does not favor citizens’ engagement in politics 
(Evans et al., 2005). Labor unions are aligned with the 
authorities and limit their claims to specific grievances 
(salaries, incentives, working conditions). The non-
profit sector can develop only when it does not exhibit 
any political agenda that would challenge the official 
line (Clarke and Pringle, 2009) and is better described 
as GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental 
organization [NGO]) than as NGOs. None of the civil 
society actors can thus be considered fully-f ledged 
stakeholders in the city’s decision making, yet they play a 
non-negligible role in developing co-creational mechanisms 
that allow residents to feel like an integral part of the city’s 
social fabric.
A good indicator of the state of the social fabric of 
each city is the distribution of the workforce. Norilsk is a 
city for working-age people, with few young people and 
few retirees: of a population of 176 000, 85 000 are in the 
workforce. The workforce is approximately the same size 
in Murmansk (90 000) and in Yakutsk (83 000), which have 
almost twice as many residents as Norilsk. The division of 
the workforce is most balanced in Murmansk where 30% 
work in public services (e.g., local administration, education 
and culture, health care), 27% in the transportation and 
storage sector, 15% in the military, 10% in industry, and 
9% in the retail sector (MurmanskStat, 2018). These 
numbers confirm Murmansk’s commercial and military 
function. In Yakutsk, the picture is quite different: 60% of 
the workforce (50 000 of 83 000) works in public services, 
with only 22% in the retail sector and 18% in industry 
(Federal State Statistics Service, 2017c). The dominance of 
public services results from the city’s status as the capital of 
the republic. Norilsk is a much more diversified city, with 
quite developed consumption and public service sectors. 
One-third of the city’s workforce works for the mineral 
extraction sector (Norilsk Nickel and its subsidiaries), with 
the rest divided between the private consumption sector, 
including retail and leisure, and public services (Federal 
State Statistics Service, 2016; City of Norilsk, 2017).
However, once one explores the number of small and 
medium enterprises, the picture looks different: Norilsk 
has three times fewer microbusinesses (around 5000 
compared to 15 000 for Murmansk and 18 000 for Yakutsk) 
and even fewer small businesses (164 compared to 660 and 
519, respectively) (Federal Tax Service, 2018). These data 
should be taken with some caution, as they do not capture 
the shadow economy. Fieldwork observations confirm that 
Norilsk is much more entrepreneurial than the official 
numbers suggest, but this entrepreneurship is partly hidden 
(author’s fieldwork and interviews with local entrepreneurs 
from ethnic minorities, Norilsk, July 2013 and July 2015). 
That said, the difference between the three cities is striking. 
In terms of spending to develop and support small and 
medium entrepreneurship, in 2012 Yakutsk spent 252 
rubles per resident, Norilsk spent 39, and Murmansk, 17 
(Federal State Statistics Service, n.d.). Small and medium 
entrepreneurship deeply shapes the urban landscape, 
especially in terms of retail and leisure places. As we 
can see from Table 3, Yakutsk has a thriving retail and 
consumption sector with a proliferation of small businesses 
selling ethnic clothing, kitchenware, jewelry, souvenirs, 
and films and music, as well as traditional subsistence (e.g., 
hunting, fishing, reindeer herding) products. It is followed 
by Murmansk, while Norilsk faces a deficit of retail 
infrastructure (Zamyatina, 2007).
If one looks at the number of nonprofit organizations 
registered by the Ministry of Justice at the city level, a similar 
trend is noticeable: Norilsk has only 213, compared to 569 for 
Murmansk and 753 for Yakutsk (MinJust, 2018). Even with 
their limitations, the data illustrate the very limited civil 
society sector in Norilsk and in contrast to the dynamism of 
urban entrepreneurship in Yakutsk and, to a lesser extent, 
in Murmansk. The more diversified the city’s economic 
outlook, the more diversified and dynamic the social fabric, 
leaving more room for private initiatives, whether economic 
or social. Norilsk also found itself at the bottom of the 
“fate control” (the ability to make and implement its own 
decisions) index developed by Andrei Petrov for 12 Arctic 
cities (Larsen et al., 2015; Petrov, in press). 
Yakutsk appears to be the richest of the three cities in 
terms of cultural institutions (libraries, museums, music and 
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art schools, theaters, cinemas, circuses, “parks of culture”), 
with 74 entities, compared to 61 for Murmansk and just 
29 for Norilsk (Federal State Statistics Service, n.d.). The 
educational sector looks fairly similar: Yakutsk dominates 
with 68 establishments, followed by Murmansk with 48 
and Norilsk with 43 (Federal State Statistics Service, n.d.). 
This has allowed Yakutsk to set itself apart due to its rising 
“creative class:” a whole generation of young and educated 
people, mostly Indigenous, who want to become active 
citizens of their city, mostly through cultural initiatives. 
The city benefits from a whole class of Indigenous cultural 
cadres who have created a bottom-up dynamic (Kuklina 
et al., 2019). In Norilsk, cultural life is mostly a top-down 
process, with public institutions (theater, dance, museums) 
supported by the municipality or by Norilsk Nickel. 
Murmansk finds itself in the middle; because it competes 
with other regional capitals such as Arkhangelsk and 
Petrozavodsk, and obviously St. Petersburg, it has trouble 
keeping its cultural elites, who tend to leave, although 
it does have a large enough municipal budget to provide 
consistent top-down support for cultural production 
(author’s interviews with city council members, association 
representatives, and university professors, Murmansk, July 
2016). 
Interaction with Foreign Actors and Branding
Branding is now a constitutive part of the city used to 
communicate a local identity to its own population as well 
as to external observers. In a neoliberal economy, cities 
have to market themselves like any other commodity in 
order to attract investors as well as tourists: the goal is 
to look global, creative, and smart. But branding is much 
more than just a product of neoliberal thinking to stimulate 
consumption. It gives cities the opportunity to produce 
a symbolic power that will impact their residents in their 
interaction with the authorities and therefore in the creation 
of an urban regime that is also an affective geography 
and urban imaginary (Dinnie, 2011; Vanolo, 2017; for the 
Russian case, see Makarychev and Yatsyk, 2015).
In terms of city branding, Murmansk stands above 
Yakutsk and Norilsk. The city promotes itself as separate 
from the region—the Murmansk region’s other cities being 
declining mining monotowns, they are less attractive than 
the regional capital—even if it plays on some appealing 
elements of the surrounding nature, such as ski resorts 
and forests. In its branding, Murmansk orients itself 
mostly toward Scandinavian countries that are seen as key 
partners for investments and progressive neighbors, and 
targets Scandinavian tourists by offering winter sports 
cheaper than in Norway, for instance (Murmansk Regional 
Government, 2018; on Arctic tourism, see Pashkevich, 2013; 
Stepanova and Shulepov, 2016). It also tries to cultivate its 
status as both an industrial and a military port, the host 
of the Northern Fleet, and the point of departure for the 
Northern Sea Route and the booming Arctic cruise industry 
(Nilsen, 2016). In that respect, Murmansk competes 
intensely with Arkhangelsk, which it has been battling for 
the title of Russia’s Arctic Capital. Arkhangelsk benefits 
from a rich historical and architectural legacy, as well as an 
Arctic Federal University (the status of “federal university” 
is the highest in Russia, bringing guaranteed state subsidies 
and privileged recognition), while Murmansk appears more 
industrialized and less charming, but is economically more 
dynamic and better connected to Nordic Europe. 
For Yakutsk, branding itself as a city outside of the 
republic framework presents some challenges. The majority 
of branding efforts have been done at the republic level, 
emphasizing Sakha’s wilderness (e.g., tourism to the Lena 
River Pillars), its richness in terms of prehistory (e.g., 
preserved mammoths), permafrost, and ethnic identity 
(celebrated through festivals and handicrafts, especially 
jewelry) (author’s fieldwork, Yakutsk, July 2017). Cultural 
tourism therefore constitutes a central element of this 
branding, even if the city is not a tourist destination and has 
little to offer besides being the point of departure for the 
rest of the republic. Nevertheless, it operates a techno-park 
for start-ups and hosts several important festivals, including 
one around the Olonkho epic, recognized by UNESCO as a 
Masterpiece of Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity 
(Kuklina and Shishigina, in press). Moreover, the massive 
rural exodus of young Yakuts to Yakutsk reveals that the 
city is seen as “the place to be” for all those hoping for 
upward social mobility. Indeed the city’s aspiration to 
become Russia’s Arctic capital is not unfounded.
Branding is more difficult for Norilsk. While it is no 
longer a closed city that once required Russian citizens to 
get a permit to visit it, its legacy as a place that limited the 
flow of non-residents endures. Its high level of pollution, its 
gulag past, and its partly abandoned Soviet suburbs do not 
constitute fertile ground for innovative branding, although 
post-industrial tourism could be an option if the city were 
interested in attracting foreigners. However, this lack of 
branding does not mean that the city lacks a strong local 
TABLE 3. Retail infrastructure in Murmansk, Norilsk, and Yakutsk in 2017.
 Number of shops Surface area of shops (m2) Number of restaurants, cafes, and bars
Murmansk 1543 291 342 167
Norilsk 550 130 078 101
Yakutsk 1414 387 969 294
Source: Federal State Statistics Service, 2017a–c. Entries “magaziny,” “kolichestvo ob’’ektov roznichnoi torgovli i obshchestvennogo 
pitaniia,” “ploshchad’ torgovogo zala ob’’ektov roznichnoi torgovli,” and “restorany, kafe, bary.”
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identity. Residents show a high level of local patriotism and 
pride in the city’s industrial successes and its pioneering 
status, a pride that is also shared by foreign labor migrants 
(Laruelle and Hohmann, 2017).
ORGANIC, SYMBOLIC,
AND INSTRUMENTAL REGIMES
The three Arctic cities discussed above represent the three 
categories proposed by Stone (1987, 1989), and Mossberger 
and Stocker (2001) in their typology of urban regimes.
Norilsk belongs to the category of organic regimes. The 
city’s closeness allows for a tight-knit social fabric that 
is not welcoming to outsiders. It has a fairly homogenous 
population oriented around the Norilsk Nickel firm and 
is focused on sustaining the economic and social status 
quo. The population is highly supportive, for instance, of 
a new closed status for the city (author’s interviews with 
city council members and association representatives, July 
2013 and July 2015), which many see as a way to guarantee 
the preservation of its status as a stable place. Securing 
public order is thus seen as a key component of the social 
consensus. The firm constitutes a hegemonic stakeholder—
the other actors can only act at the margins of Norilsk 
Nickel decisions, trying to influence minor sectors of the 
city’s life, but unable to challenge the firm’s dominance. 
The city displays nostalgia for the 1960s–70s, when it 
was a privileged cultural microcosm (Limonier, 2018), 
and celebrates its glorious Soviet past, with almost no 
vision of a transformative future. Very few projects try 
to reinvent Norilsk beyond its extractive industry past 
and present. Only Norilsk Nickel itself could one day, for 
profitability reasons, decide to dramatically reduce its 
activities in Norilsk (by moving them to other regions, as it 
has already begun to do) and thereby have a life-changing 
impact on the future of the city. Without this impulse, 
all the other actors will continue to push for a status quo 
policy. Due to its status as a provider of strategic resources 
to the Russian state, Norilsk does not display some of the 
features of organic regimes in different political contexts, 
such as a high level of autonomy from external actors. The 
city functions in a symbiotic relationship with the firm that 
protects it from overly abrupt changes, but also hampers the 
development of any post-extractive future. 
Yakutsk belongs to the symbolic regime category. Even if 
the city’s identity is consubstantial with that of the republic, 
it has a clearly forward-looking agenda of transforming the 
city’s image and functionality. It aims to revitalize it not 
through preserving its architectural heritage (which it did 
not have), but through cultural Indigenous activities, the 
production of knowledge and human capital (investing in 
higher education has been one of the city’s main successes), 
and science and technology (this domain remains more 
aspirational, given its remoteness and Russia’s general 
business climate). 
Contrary to Norilsk, the equilibrium between 
stakeholders is more balanced in Yakutsk, with no single 
stakeholder particularly dominant, and certainly no big 
firm with its own agenda. The main impulse comes from 
the municipal authorities and the republic administration, 
whose goal is to make the city demographically and 
economically prosperous, as well as internationally visible. 
Again, unlike Norilsk, the municipal authorities are fairly 
welcoming of resident involvement. Public participation is 
motivated by symbolic meanings offered to the growing 
share of the Indigenous population, for whom urbanization 
is a sign of upward mobility. Yakutsk offers its residents a 
new urban paradigm founded on identity entrepreneurship: 
promoting “Sakha-ness” in an urban environment to 
dissociate Indigenous identity from a rurality partly seen as 
a lost cause, developing a strong local identity—both local 
in celebrating its Indigenous roots and global in its will 
to integrate world trends—and becoming Russia’s most 
famous Indigenous northern city.
Murmansk belongs to the category of instrumental 
regimes and finds itself, in many respects, halfway 
between Norilsk and Yakutsk. Like Yakutsk, it does 
not have a hegemonic stakeholder, yet contrary to it, it 
features some strong economic actors that play a key role 
in the city’s urban regime. Unlike Yakutsk and similar to 
Norilsk, it depends on a strong relationship with Moscow 
because of the city’s status as a strategic Russian port. Its 
urban actors exhibit different agendas, yet they all aim to 
counter the city’s decline since its Soviet golden age by 
applying concrete policies in different economic sectors: 
port activities, transport hub, military revival, and winter 
and Arctic tourism. To that end, a multiplicity of actors 
with different agendas work together to build functional 
coalitions: the military lobbies Moscow for more funding 
for the Northern Fleet; Arctic transport actors compete with 
Arkhangelsk to secure the city’s status as Russia’s main 
Arctic port for the Northern Sea Route; the fishing industry 
tries to reinvent itself in partnership and competition with 
Norway; the transport and storage realm tries to improve 
the city’s connectivity; and the municipality makes the 
most of its proximity to Scandinavia. 
In such a context, urban coalitions demonstrate a growing 
public-private partnership as well as the involvement of 
foreign investors, often from neighboring Scandinavian 
countries, and see their value in delivering tangible results 
to the population. The city has a multifaceted image that 
performs different functions for different constituencies. 
Public participation finds itself somewhere between the 
“closed” Norilsk and the “open” Yakutsk: residents are 
welcome to engage in the city’s everyday functioning but 
in a much more managed and controlled way, with limited 
scope for innovation and no ability to propose alternatives 
to the future outlined for Murmansk by the main local 
actors and by Moscow.
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CONCLUSIONS
The notion of urban regime offers a comprehensive 
set of tools for capturing the diversity of social contracts 
in place in the urban context and should not be reserved 
only for democratic environments. More authoritarian 
regimes likewise need to find a common language with 
their populations: they cannot function purely through 
repression, but have to favor co-optational and co-creational 
mechanisms, even if the number of stakeholders participating 
in decision making is limited. The rise of urban activism in 
Russia’s big metropoles illustrates how much the city level 
now epitomizes a new way for citizens to “do politics” and 
display a plurality of opinions and competition that the 
national level has yet to allow. Because of its size, Russia 
offers a unique context in which to look at the diversity of 
urban regimes in a region too often viewed through the prism 
of authoritarianism, uniformness, and centralization. 
Northern cities, built in a challenging climatic 
environment and consequently facing connectivity 
challenges, offer an insightful case of urban regime 
diversity. With the mass exodus of populations from 
Russia’s Arctic regions since the 1990s, cities have had to 
reinvent themselves by investing in local patriotism, by 
inculcating a feeling of belonging, and, in some cases, by 
imagining a new economic future that moves away from 
resource extraction toward more sustainable innovation 
and human capital-based sectors. Northern cities’ urban 
regimes are limited in their autonomy due to tax and non-
tax systems of income redistribution that primarily benefit 
the federal center. Yet they still display different coalitions 
of power that represent the three main categories or 
urban regimes defined by Mossberger and Stocker (2001): 
organic, symbolic, and instrumental. This brief exploration 
of three northern cities hopes to open the path to a more 
in-depth comparative study of circumpolar urban regimes. 
With the rapid urbanization of the Arctic in the decades 
to come (Rasmussen, 2011; Larsen and Fondahl, 2014), 
Arctic governmentality will be centered not only on 
preserving traditional ways of life, but on improving ways 
of living together in an urban context and on taking into 
consideration the growing Indigenous population as one of 
the city’s main stakeholders.
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